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Highlights 
• Ecosystem services help itemise how we value natural places, but the concept is not robust. 
• A more robust framework should focus on aspects of human appreciation of places. 
• We propose an ecosystem valuing framework with 12 universal aspects of appreciation. 
• This can be unambiguously complemented by ecological analyses where necessary. 
 
 
Abstract 
The ecosystem services framework (ESF) is advantageous and widely used for itemising and 
quantifying ways in which humans benefit from natural places.  However, it suffers from two 
important problems: (i) incoherence of definitions and (ii) a narrow approach to valuation, 
inadequate to represent the full range of human motives for conservation and the diverse interests of 
different stakeholders.  These shortcomings can lead to a range of problems including double-
counting, blind spots and unintended consequencest.  Here we propose an ecosystem valuing 
framework (EVF) as a broader and more rigorous way to deliver the benefits currently sought from 
the ESF, without the conceptual problems.   
 
 
The flawed genius of ecosystem services 
The ecosystem services framework (ESF) is a very popular approach to incentivising nature 
conservation, increasingly used by conservation campaigners and policy makers around the world as 
well as by scientists contributing to this cause.  Its genius is to facilitate a multi-dimensional analysis 
of the benefits that humans may derive from natural places, allowing a wide range of interests and 
conservation concerns to be considered and integrated with a broad view of sustainable development 
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and human wellbeing.  As such it supports a consequentialist ethic that can be more successful than 
deontological approaches (see Glossary) in securing consensus and motivating action [1].  However, 
criticisms of the ESF as a tool for conservation raise doubts about its effectiveness and legitimacy [2, 
3]. The most controversial issue is probably that of monetisation, as laid out recently by Silvertown 
[4].  One set of responses to such problems would continue using the ESF as a general tool for 
assessing habitats while recognising its multilayered structure [5], supervising it to avoid unintended 
consequences [6], perhaps discouraging monetisation [7], and even attempting to subjugate intrinsic 
value under the category of services [8].  Yet there are more profound problems with the ESF that 
call for a radical shift if we wish to contribute to conservation as part of a sustainable development 
agenda.  Two outstanding issues are sufficient, in our opinion, to demand an overhaul of the ESF so 
radical as to require a new name.  First, the definitions do not work.  The fact that definitions of 
‘ecosystem services’ (ES) and of specific categories are often vague, tautologous and/or at variance 
with the concepts actually employed is symptomatic of deep-seated problems, as we shall explain.  
Second, collapsing multiple human value judgments into one or a few numerical values is a form of 
devaluation.  We unpack this claim by exploring the inescapably cultural foundation of valuation 
processes.  
 
Coupling the ESF with the concern for sustainable development leads to the concept of natural 
capital, which is posited as underpinning (and sometimes including) ES [9].  Taken as the underlying 
substance that must be conserved in order to maintain delivery of ES, natural capital is prone to 
similar criticisms, although less susceptible to financial trading.  The solution we will propose, by 
contrast, shifts focus from commodities to relationships between specific stakeholders and places 
[10].  
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What exactly is an ecosystem service? 
Definitions of ES [11] range from “the conditions and processes through which natural 
ecosystems…sustain and fulfil human life” [12] through “the outputs of ecosystems from which 
people derive benefits” [13] to “the benefits people obtain from ecosystems” [14]; cf [15].  The 
variety of focal nouns in this sample of definitions (conditions, processes, outputs and benefits) 
reveals the difficulty of finding a logical category for things that motivate humans to protect natural 
habitats and places [16].  Fisher, Turner and Morling [17], affirming that ES must both be ecological 
and lead to human benefits, define ES as “the aspects of ecosystems utilized (actively or passively) 
to produce human well-being”.  We find ‘aspect’ a more useful term, though not for something 
‘utilized’.  In fact, a minimal set of commonly-studied ES cannot logically be covered by any of the 
above definitions (Table 1) – and some studies [18] seem unconstrained by any of them.  A 
definition encompassing all of these definitions would have to be very broad – something like “those 
ecological processes and their effects that certain humans appreciate”.  But thanks to the existence of 
appreciative ecologists, such a definition would have unlimited scope.  
 
Some other posited ES cannot be construed in a way that fulfils any of the above definitions.  For 
example, animal welfare is considered in the UK National Ecosystem Assessment [13], yet its 
beneficiaries are not human unless we consider the satisfaction of concerned humans (in which case 
any ecological state of affairs that makes someone happier is an ES).  Meanwhile, the biodiversity of 
an area [19] is sometimes considered an ES, and a subtle semantic shift from ‘biological diversity’ as 
an index (an intangible metric of diversity) [20] to ‘biodiversity’ being an actual aggregate (almost a 
synonym for ‘assemblage’) [21] allows biodiversity to be simultaneously presented as also 
underpinning all other ES and having ‘existence value’ [5].  The value of such concepts of 
biodiversity is not in question, but to construe any of them as a process, output or human benefit 
seems illogical.  
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Looking at the definitions of categories of ES, problems are multiplied.  Take the four categories of 
the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment [22], three of which also form the basis of the Common 
International Classification of Ecosystem Services [23].  Perhaps ‘provisioning services’ is 
unproblematic – indeed a good model for ES, since beneficiaries in this case are consumers who 
consciously value the foodstuffs and raw materials that come under this category.  ‘Regulating 
services’ might raise the question as to where a target value or set point for regulation can come  from 
[24] – short of accepting something like the Gaia Hypothesis [25].  Presumably the term is simply 
meant to denote ecological effects that mimic the regulation that one might wish for, or that 
generally slow environmental change [26].  Regulating services are not clarified by the tautology 
engendered when the word ‘regulation’ is normally repeated within the definitions of examples – 
apart from pollination [22], the ‘regulatory’ sense of which remains unclear to us.  ‘Supporting 
services’ [2] and ‘cultural services’ [27], meanwhile, are simply too broad.  The former potentially 
includes every conceivable ecological process, since benefits for the well-being of someone can 
always be posited, while the latter potentially includes every positive human attitude to any element 
of the environment.  The breadth of these categories exacerbates the risk of double-counting, while 
the vagueness makes a balanced audit elusive: how could one ever assess the ‘supporting disservices’ 
or ‘cultural disservices’ of an ecosystem?  Below we argue that these last two categories of ES 
represent complementary but contrasting approaches to motivating nature conservation: each can 
ground a whole framework for analysis.  
 
Parallel problems emerge for other concepts that might be used in a definition of ES, such as 
‘processes/functions; structural components; goods; human uses; securities’ [11].  The hope is 
sometimes expressed that definitional problems will decline as definitions gradually improve [3].  
But the problems we face are not merely about vagueness; they arise from forcing distinct concepts 
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into a single semantic category.  The examples under ‘Valuing Ecosystems’ below suggest how they 
may continue fostering blind spots, unintended consequences and mistrust until the confusion is 
resolved.  
 
How do humans value? 
‘Value’ is a multivalent English word that can hinder logical analysis.  Before advocating its use as a 
verb, we outline three of its divergent meanings as a noun that are highly relevant : economic, ethical 
and numerical.  There is, firstly, an unavoidable economic aspect to nature conservation, in that some 
kind of prioritisation has to be made in the face of competing land-use claims.  This in turn should 
reflect people’s values – their ethics – and need not entail monetisation, or any common currency of 
assessment at all.  A single numerical value, therefore, cannot capture the diverse ways in which 
people may value a given place, important though it is to quantify these.  A prominent strand of 
value theory (Box 1) argues for the irreducible plurality of evaluative concepts, and everyday 
experience shows that people both perceive and value such goods as health, utility, diversity, beauty 
and generosity in different ways [28].  Compressing assessments of such distinct ‘values’ onto a 
smaller number of axes ignores the intrinsic dimensionality of the situation and is a form of 
devaluation [2].  It may also produce category errors, helping to explain the definitional problems 
outlined above.  By reducing a broad range of human motives to the category of services, the ESF 
reveals the influence of the rational-choice paradigm of microeconomics [29] and fails to do justice 
to the reality of human attitudes towards places and their conservation.  This we explore in the next 
section.  
 
Further complexity is added by the plurality of stakeholders. Beneficiaries are often specified on an 
ad-hoc basis, without regard to their socio-economic status [2] or not at all, as if everyone 
appreciated the same benefits equally [30].  Yet ecosystems do not produce a pool of benefits 
7 
 
independently of actual beneficiaries.  Rather, benefits arise from particular people's interactions 
with particular places [31], often with technological input, communication, legal facilitation and 
many other cultural factors [32].  It is too easy to conceive of ES emanating from abstract classes of 
habitat, overlooking the uniqueness of places that can make them valuable to particular people.  Yet 
surveys of stakeholders tend to emphasise cultural ES associated with the distinctiveness of places 
[33].  Only when interest groups are poorly or narrowly specified or when certain groups are 
excluded from the process is it possible to proceed to a summary valuation.  “The current campaign 
to define the world as an immense collection of service commodit ies” [34] then allows marketisation 
and legislation that, one might suspect, enable owners of capital to be served as the ultimate 
beneficiaries [2].  The emerging discipline of political ecology is bringing important scrutiny of 
conservation agendas in the light of considerations of equity and power. 
 
Valuing ecosystems 
Valuation must be seen as a complex human cultural process – and not merely in assessing cultural 
ES [35].  Indeed, the ubiquitous yet vague ‘cultural services’ category probably derives from 
“perceptions of culture as opposed to nature, biased towards globalized Eurocentric leisure-time 
concepts”, etc, reflecting the captivity of Western thought to a dualism of the immaterial and the 
subjective vs. the material and the objective [36].  It can be argued that all ES, insofar as they 
motivate conservation, are psycho-socio-culturally mediated [2, 34].  For example, even the 
provisioning of wheat by the world’s major agroecosystems is an ES only in virtue of consumers’ 
cultural conditioning to eat certain foods, and the loss of this service could, hypothetically, be 
accommodated by a corresponding shift in diets.  Readers unconvinced about this point might 
instead appreciate the evolutionary psychology of valuation: how one’s perceptions might reflect 
processes that tend to increase one’s inclusive fitness [37].  In either case, contextual awareness must 
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remain acutely important for understanding disagreements, potential disbenefits and conflicts of 
interest [35].   
 
We end our critique by mentioning some examples of conservation motivations that are difficult to 
capture in the ESF.  Several studies have documented how people appreciate places by serving them 
and their constituent organisms rather than considering themselves served by an ecosystem [38] and 
by giving up time to protect or improve them [39, 40].  To these we add a brief example of 
stakeholder exclusion in conservation negotiations.  Grazing on the Sinai Peninsula is said to damage 
scarce vegetation, and domestic grazing in the St Katherine Protectorate has been outlawed and in 
some areas physically prevented, despite being central to the livelihoods of people who traditionally 
graze their flocks in these habitats [41].  A conservation-oriented analysis of this complicated 
situation should recognise how the Bedouin people benefit from these arid lands in ways that are 
apparently disregarded by interventions focusing on the interests of other beneficiaries.  It should 
also consider the contested ecology of the situation, where local people claim that their grazing 
actually improves survival in grazed species [42].  
 
What is needed is a framework that consistently distinguishes ecological processes from human 
modes of appreciating them.  A proper treatment should be intrinsically multi-dimensional and 
recognise mutual human–environment relationships [10] involving diverse stakeholders.  
 
 
Beyond services: introducing the Ecosystem Valuing Framework 
We suggest that conservationists should avoid the language of services altogether and adopt a 
framework that recognises diverse aspects of human valuation for specified people and places.  To 
facilitate this, we here propose an ecosystem valuing framework.  This explicitly recognises that 
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human experience provides the starting point for analysing the full range of ways in which 
ecosystems may be appreciated.  This may be seen as a strategy of developing the ‘cultural services’ 
category; in closing we will briefly consider what can still be done with the popular approach of 
starting with ecological processes.  
 
To understand ecosystem valuation we ideally need a comprehensive set of logically-distinct 
possible ways in which people may value natural places, and we find a candidate suite of axes in 
aspectual theory.  This philosophical framework (Box 1) proposes distinct, mutually-irreducible 
aspects of reality that are experienced by humans (Table 2).  Taking the first three of these aspects as 
foundational, our proposal is that the remaining 12 aspects (Fig. 1) be used to capture the range of 
ways in which humans may stand in evaluative relationships with natural places.  These 12 
dimensions collectively cover ecological, cognitive, communal and ideological aspects of valuation, 
and there are philosophical reasons to believe that they are both comprehensive and mutually 
exclusive (Box 1).  For a given real place and a specified stakeholder, then, we ask how the 
stakeholder appreciates the place in these kinds of ways.  That is, the aspects are adverbs rather than 
nouns.  Table 2 illustrates how these aspects cover and exceed the range of the ESF.  
 
We suggest that an ecosystem valuing framework (EVF) such as this provides the flexibility and 
simplicity needed for handling a complex multidimensional problem.  It is designed to maintain the 
pragmatic, pluralistic orientation of the ESF while improving on it in important ways (Box 2).  
Clearly this proposal calls for considerable inter-disciplinary collaboration and public engagement.  
Fig. 1 suggests how each of the 12 aspects tends to be the focal concern of a particular group of 
stakeholders, and how it connects with a recognised category of value.   
 
Outlook 
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There are several further reasons why the EVF should have intuitive appeal for scientists, policy-
makers and practitioners.  First, it has the potential to meet various recommendations previously 
made for implementation of the ESF, including resilience, promotion of interdisciplinary 
collaboration and involvement of stakeholders [11], focus on direct human encounters with 
ecosystems and attention to both local and off-site effects [43].  Second, the EVF should function 
well in non-Western cultures (often found in parts of the world of great conservation importance 
[38]) by downplaying the ‘humans vs. nature’ [44] and ‘cultural vs. material’ [36] dualisms typical 
of Western worldviews and recognising instead how people’s cultural identity and well-being may 
be closely bound up in relationships with the non-human world [10].  Finally, the independent 
philosophical foundations of the EVF should give confidence in its robustness and universal validity.  
Adopting the twelve aspects of valuation would provide a standard that should assist in comparison 
among studies, although ongoing work will be required to apply them through developing protocols 
and metrics (see Outstanding Questions).  
 
In focusing on human experience, an EVF might be seen as aloof from natural science research [45].  
It elicits, however, a more ecological approach as its complement.  Focusing instead on a set of 
ecological processes such as pollination, predation and nutrient cycling, one can examine how these 
underlie and influence the lives of humans and other animals in diverse ways.  Such ecological 
effects analyses, as we might call them, align with the notions of supporting services and natural 
capital.  They would include many of the biophysical ES valuations already popular with ecologists 
[46], and so the question of how they should contribute to EVF assessments is clearly of pressing 
importance (see Outstanding Questions).  But we believe that this is the correct prioritisation for the 
concerns of nature conservation and sustainable development, even as convergence is sought among 
the multiple framings of conservation [47].  An EVF should provide a more consistent and holistic 
starting point for most of the applications currently addressed using the ESF, as well as a rationale 
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for interpreting ecological effects analyses.  After all, direct human perception is the foundation of 
scientific research as well as environmental appreciation.  
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Table 1: A selection of ecosystem services and their qualification under some prominent definitions 
(1 = qualifies; 0 = does not; ? = may qualify in some situations).  The last three rows are 
counterfactual test cases: phenomena that are not (to our knowledge) considered as ES yet appear to 
fulfil some of the definitions. 
Ecosystem service …is an ecological 
process/function 
…is an ecological 
output/contribution 
…is a human 
benefit 
Insect pollinationa 1 0 0 
Climate-change reductiona 1 ? 0 
Soil formationa 1 1 0 
Water supply 0 1 1 
Food provision 0 1 1 
Recreation (opportunity) 0 0 1 
*Insect reproduction 1 ? 0 
*Photosynthetic release of oxygen b 1 1 1 
*Profit from rising timber prices 0 ? 1 
a While not themselves human benefits, these three items may lead to benefits. Yet the first two may clearly 
also lead to human disbenefits: some destructive species rely on insect pollination, and some people stand to 
benefit from climate change. 
b Our Web of Science search in July 2016 did yield 15 empirical studies (all of Chinese sites) that considered 
oxygen production, which was dropped from the Millennium Assessment’s list of examples between [14] and 
[22]. 
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Table 2. Aspects of experience, with examples for human functioning in each, correlated academic disciplines for collaboration, typical 
evaluative questions that should be asked concerning a natural site, and examples of specific variables to assess (drawn from the ESF where 
possible). 
Aspect of 
experience 
Human functioning 
(examples) 
Academic 
disciplines 
Typical evaluative 
questions (normative 
words in bold) 
Typical questions of 
reflexive valuation 
Examples of quantities and related 
ES (italicised), with relevant 
stakeholders 
Foundational aspects:   
Numerical Counting Mathematics Basis of quantification  
Spatial Measuring Geometry Basis of geographical considerations  
Kinetic Traversing Classical physics Basis of evaluating movement and change  
Ecological values (relevant to animals in general):   
Physical Sheltering; Resource-
extracting 
Physics, Chemistry How does this site 
protect us? 
 Climate/watershed regulation for 
those at risk. Fuel provision 
Biotic Eating Biology, Ecology How does it sustain 
us? 
 Food provision for consumers 
Sensory Feeling; Hearing; 
Seeing 
Psychology, 
Medicine 
How comfortable  is it 
to us? 
 Noise regulation, Health benefits 
for local residents 
Cognitive values (relevant to individual humans):   
Analytical Distinguishing Philosophy, Maths How diverse is the 
vegetation to us? 
How distinct are we 
from the site? 
Biodiversity, habitat 
distinctiveness for naturalists 
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Formative Developing; Teaching Historical studies, 
Engineering, 
Education 
How richly developed 
is the site?  
How can we develop 
ourselves in it? 
Educational opportunities for local 
people 
Symbolic Communicating; 
Naming 
Linguistics, 
Cultural studies 
How meaningful is 
the site to us?  
How do we get 
information from it?  
Information functions (e.g. on food 
supply) for land-based people 
Communal values:   
Social Respecting Sociology How socially 
appropriate  is the site 
to us? 
How well can we 
socialise at the site? 
Shared recreational opportunities 
for locals, tourists, etc 
Economic Choosing; Trading; 
Optimising 
Economics How valuable  is the 
site to us? 
How do we prioritise  
the site?a 
Economic opportunities for local 
people/investors 
Aesthetic Appreciating; Joking Arts, Design How beautiful is the 
site to us? 
How do we enjoy the 
site? 
Artistic inspiration, leisure 
opportunities for tourists, etc 
Ideological values:   
Jural Allocating; Doing 
one’s duty 
Law, Politics What do we deserve 
from the site? 
What do we owe  
others from the site? b 
Benefits (climate regulation, etc) 
for other people  
Altruistic Caring; Loving Ethics How caring are we of 
the site?  
How does it enable us 
to love/care? 
Conservation action by volunteers 
Certitudinal Trusting; Knowing Religious and 
cultural studies 
How transcendental 
does the site seem? 
How do we know 
ourselves here? 
Spiritual services for interested 
parties 
a This is one of the typical aims of a whole ecosystem valuation exercise. 
b This question should bring in concern for future generations and hence sustainability. 
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Figure 1: The suite of aspects for valuing ecosystems is shown as rays emanating from an ecosystem 
(site) of interest, with the physical (reading clockwise) and certitudinal (reading anticlockwise) as 
alternative foundations of interpretation (Box 2).  Although written as adjectives to save space, the 
aspect labels should be converted to adverbs: “Physically how does stakeholder S value place P?” 
etc.  The ecological category is indicated in green, cognitive in blue, communal in red and 
ideological in purple.  Examples of stakeholders specialising in each kind of valuation are named in 
boxes, and some categories of value associated with each aspect around the periphery.  An 
assessment ought to consider all the aspects for (i) a specific place and relevant stakeholders, or (ii) 
specific stakeholders and all relevant places. 
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Glossary 
Aspect:  In aspectual theory: a fundamental mode of being and functioning, and a limit to 
the process of abstraction.  Each aspect (of which 14–17 are typically posited) 
has a core meaning that can be evoked but not defined.  In human experience 
any object functions in all the aspects, each one providing a sphere of meaning 
in which things are conceptualised.  Ethical norms are to be discerned in the 
analytical and subsequent aspects. 
Certitudinal: In aspectual theory: describing the fundamental notion of certainty, conviction 
or commitment; the way in which something motivates action. 
Consequentialist:  An approach to ethics evaluating the moral rightness of choices by the 
consequential increase or decrease in goodness brought about by them. Different 
strands of consequentialism define ‘goodness’ differently: utilitarianism, for 
example, classically considers an aggregate of well-being summed across all 
persons. 
Deontological:  An approach to ethics evaluating the moral rightness of choices by their 
conformity with norms. Deontological ethics is arguably more concerned with 
right actions than with bringing about a good state of affairs. 
Formative: In aspectual theory: describing the fundamental notion of free creative 
innovation; the way in which something can be historically new.  Dooyeweerd 
saw differentiation, rather than mere innovation, as the central norm in this 
aspect. 
Jural: In aspectual theory: describing the fundamental notion of what is due from one 
party to another; the intuitions of justice and equity that precede and ground any 
legislation. 
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Box 1: Backgrounds to aspectual theory and value theory 
Aspectual theory: 
Aspectual theory is a postulate of the reformational philosophical tradition, which was established in 
the first half of the 20th century by Herman Dooyeweerd and Dirk Vollenhoven [49] as an alternative 
to the dualistic thought that pervades Western culture [50].  It is a phenomenological framework to 
account for, among other things, how humans abstract from the integral everyday experience of reality 
and analyse objects or situations by abstracting selected aspects, which can be seen as fundamenta l ly 
distinct modes of being and functioning [51]. Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven identified fifteen 
mutually- irreducible aspects, although such a list is open to empirical revision. Aspects provide an 
intuitive categorisation of the diversity of meanings that can be ascribed to an object, phenomenon or 
situation.  Reformational philosophy eschews reductionist claims about either an underlying substance 
(‘matter’) or social constructivism to explain our shared perceptions and posits instead a suite of natural 
laws that cause similar aspects and norms to be discernible at all times and across all cultures.  
Conflating the aspects is a common source of paradoxes, such as Zeno’s (reducing the kinetic aspect 
to the spatial) and Theseus’ (conflating the physical aspect with others such as the formative). 
Dooyeweerd [49] found specific dependencies among the aspects.  Table 2lists them in their order of 
conceptual dependence (numerical as primary, certitudinal as final), but reading the table from bottom 
to top indicates an epistemic dependence (certitudinal as fundamental to our thinking, numerical as 
most peripheral [52]). Thus a comprehensive multi-aspectual assessment by a given stakeholder should 
have an inner coherence that is lost in combining isolated judgements about, say, the beauty or intrins ic 
value of a place. Also, since each aspect may be the focus of an academic discipline (Table 2), their 
integral coherence and mutual irreducibility cautions against attempts to seek an authorita t ive 
assessment from any single discipline. On the contrary, inter-disciplinarity is encouraged. 
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Value theory: 
Whereas traditional ethical theorising focuses on how a person may choose the “right” course of 
action, value theory (related to axiology)focuses on how people attribute ‘goodness’ to different 
entities or situations according to their properties [53].  While this approach avoids the traditional 
dichotomy between consequentialist and deontological ethics, it raises its own questions about 
extrinsic vs intrinsic, and conditional vs unconditional, values [54].  A strand of thought aligned with 
our proposal sees values as context-dependent.  For example, Judith Thomson [55] argues that 
‘good’ is meaningless without a context: one must understand some way in which a thing X is good, 
such as “for purpose P” or “for the wellbeing of subject S” – so that we can understand the 
contrasting senses of attributions like “good for cane toads” and “good for killing cane toads”, as 
well as divergent forms of goodness such as generosity, justice and beauty. Accepting the 
fundamental multiplexity of goodness actually makes a consequentialist analysis problematic, since 
divergent values cannot be reduced to a common currency in order to assess the “best” course of 
action [56].   
 
Aspectual theory lends itself to this view rather well.  Thus the columns of examples in Table 2 may 
be read as ways in which a place may be good for particular people and their interests.  The alleged 
comprehensiveness of the suite of aspects suggests that they can encompass all the possible kinds of 
value that might be invoked in the discourses of conservation and sustainable development.  
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Box 2: The Ecosystem Valuing Framework 
 
The ecosystem valuing framework (EVF) proposed here is a set of 12 categories for a systematic 
analysis of how specified stakeholders value a place or ecosystem.  Each category evokes a distinct 
aspect of the place, as outlined in Fig. 1 and Table 2.  Below is a summary of the framework and 
some of the advantages it offers over the ESF:  
 The EVF is a tool to consider the ways in which sites may be appreciated holistically, without 
applying the consumeristic category of services: it entails asking ‘how’ rather than ‘what’ people 
appreciate.  The starting assumption is that any stakeholder will value any given place to varying 
degrees (including negatively) in each of the 12 aspects, and an evaluation therefore consists in 
attributing relative scores on as many as possible of these axes of valuation.  They would 
naturally be presented graphically on a radar diagram.  
 It is essential to specify at the outset which stakeholders are being considered.  This necessitates 
consultation or at least empathy (e.g. if any non-human animals’ values are to be considered 
[57]).  Dialogue and diplomacy may then be required for reaching a consensus for action. 
 In practice, evaluations might be either site-focused (e.g. for prioritisation exercises, considering 
all interested stakeholders) or stakeholder-focused (e.g. for policy development, considering 
many sites and various spatial and temporal horizons).   
 For translating between the ESF and the EVF it may be helpful to conceive of most regulating 
services initially in terms of the physical aspect of appreciation and of provisioning services in 
terms of the physical and biotic aspects.  However, the EVF does not directly cover the notions 
of services or benefits: thus timber as a commodity or CO2 as a disutility, for example, cannot be 
directly considered.  Meanwhile, the ambiguity of ‘cultural services’ can be lessened by using the 
full suite of aspects of appreciation.  
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 Recognising the coherence among the aspects can help interpret the divergent perspectives of 
different stakeholders.  For example, religious or existential convictions underlying a person’s 
certitudinal and altruistic evaluations may shed light on their evaluations in the preceding 
aspects. 
 The EVF intrinsically makes the normative nature of conservation explicit, facilitating the 
identification of negative as well as positive considerations, and “maintaining a plurality of 
values up to the point of decision-making” [28].  With the EVF, this “plurality of values” can be 
positivised as “a dozen (or more) evaluative scores”.  
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Outstanding Questions 
 
1. What variables should be used to implement the axes of the EVF? 
As indicated in Fig. 1, we propose that the latter 12 of the 15 commonly-accepted aspects provide 
comprehensive coverage of the range of fundamentally-distinct ways in which people may appreciate 
natural places.  Some of these aspects readily evoke common assessments: the physical, biotic, 
sensory, analytical, social, aesthetic and economic (albeit sometimes under different names) are 
largely familiar from the ESF and other environmental assessment frameworks.  The formative, 
symbolic, jural, altruistic and certitudinal aspects, however, are less often considered and will need 
careful consideration: how can they be quantified?  Also, as indicated in Table 2, the post-ecological 
aspects in the list have a reflexive side: e.g. how humans not only form and develop a place, 
historically, but also form themselves through a place, educationally.  Thus overall there could be up 
to 21 evaluative questions.  But one might ask if some of these should be combined or downplayed.  
 
2. How should scientific understanding of ecological processes be combined with the EVF? 
Given the existence of modelling tools like InVEST [47] to quantify biophysical outputs, it would be 
efficient to use the analysis of “supporting services” and other ecological effects to inform EVF 
assessments without always consulting stakeholders directly.  This is normally the only possibility if 
non-human species are considered; for humans it is similar to what happens when researchers model 
the hypothetical wellbeing of classes of people like subsistence farmers in a particular location on the 
basis of projected environmental factors (like climate change).  Such evaluations are often restricted 
to the physical and biotic aspects of wellbeing, although effects in the sensitive aspect and, of course, 
the analytic, can also readily be modelled.  But can ecological models help with any higher aspects 
of human experience?  And how can uncertainty be accounted for, in cases where a scientific 
consensus is contested by key stakeholders or simply does not exist? 
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3. How do the axes of the EVF tie in with sustainable development goals in general? 
Each of the United Nations’ 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) [57] may be characterised by 
one or more of the EVF aspects, and many map largely onto a single aspect (e.g. those concerning 
energy and climate, hunger, well-being, education, communities, justice and the various economic 
goals).  Comprehensive assessments of natural places in terms of these aspects should therefore 
foster integration with the SDGs, but the best ways of combining them will require extensive 
exploration.  True sustainability will call for a long-term perspective, with particular concern for the 
economic norm of frugality, while the jural norm of fairness must be applied with regard to future 
generations. 
 
